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Abstract
This paper is intended to be an outline of Kuhn's conception of the relations between the history of science and the history of art and, at the same time, an introduction to Kuhn's philosophy of science. Kuhn considers that his influential book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is a portrayal of the development of science as a succession of periods dominated by tradition and punctuated by non-cumulative ruptures.  He borrows this idea of development from other fields, including the history of art.  Thus, I follow here the footsteps of the Austrian historian of art, Ernst Gombrich, whose name is suggested by Kuhn himself. And I strive to show what Kuhn has in mind when he speaks of a transposition of the idea of non-cumulative development, found in the history of art, to the realm of science (which was traditionally thought to be characterized by a specific cumulative progress). This allows us to introduce some of Kuhn's fundamental notions of the philosophy of science, such as the concepts of "paradigm" and "incommensurability", understanding them beforehand, more intuitively, within the context of the history of art. 
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 1. Introduction
When I received the kind invitation to deliver this lecture​[1]​ on the work of Thomas Kuhn, I was told that the audience would include undergraduate university students. That led me to search for a topic that could serve to introduce Kuhn´s philosophy of science while at the same time piquing my own interest as well as that of the other professors present. As a result, I settled on a topic that is seldom addressed:  Kuhn´s views on the relations between the history of science and the history of art.
My strategy to achieve this objective may admittedly be suicidal. Since the invitation was to speak about the philosophy of science, and thus discuss philosophy as well as science – two of the broadest and most complex fields of human culture – nothing ‘better’ than to complicate the matter further by also bringing art into the discussion to illustrate the subject.  While art may arguably be considered the most appropriate vehicle to illustrate something, this is not my only pretext for talking about art.  
To begin with, to a much greater extent than science, art is present in the culture as general knowledge, and everyone has had some contact with the art of the great masters. So I am confident that this is an appropriate starting point for my purposes.
The second pretext for talking about art is more important, and I actually present it as a justification. When Kuhn commented in 1970, in the epilogue of the second edition of his book, about the fact that many believed that his principal theses could be applied to other fields besides physics, he conceded that, to the extent to which the book “portrays scientific development as a succession of tradition-bound periods punctuated by non-cumulative breaks”, his theses truly did have broader application.  And he added:
But they should be, for they are borrowed from other fields. Historians of literature, of music, of the arts, of political development, and of many other human activities have long described their subjects in the same way. Periodization in terms of revolutionary breaks in style, taste, and institutional structure have been among their standard tools. If I have been original with respect to concepts like these, it has mainly been by applying them to the sciences, fields which had been widely thought to develop in a different way (Kuhn 1970, p. 208, the italics are mine).
Thus, my proposal here is to briefly discuss some aspects that traditionally characterize the development of art and that, according to Thomas Kuhn, could contribute to understanding the development of science, as well. What he aims to show is that the difference between science and art is, in many important ways, not as great as is believed.  But why is it generally believed that art is so very different from science?
 
2. Gombrich and the history of art
We will begin by considering art so that we can then speak with greater clarity regarding these supposed or real differences between science and art.  In my incursion into art, I will follow the footsteps of the Austrian art historian, Ernst Gombrich, whose name is suggested by Kuhn himself.​[2]​  
Looking, for example, at the Egyptian reliefs and paintings in Figures 1 and 2, of which everyone has seen at least reproductions, one can easily find them strange and perplexing. The reason, writes Gombrich in his book The Story of Art​[3]​, is that
the Egyptian painters had quite a different way of representing real life from our way. Perhaps this is connected with the different purpose their paintings had to serve. What mattered most was not prettiness but completeness. It was the artists' task to preserve everything as clearly and permanently as possible. So they did not set out to sketch nature as it appeared to them from any fortuitous angle. They drew from memory, according to strict rules which ensured that everything that had to go into the picture would stand out in perfect clarity. (…) Everything had to be represented from its most characteristic angle (SA, pp. 60-61).
When representing the human body, Gombrich writes,
The head was most easily seen in profile so they drew it sideways. But if we think of the human eye we think of it as seen from the front. Accordingly, a full-face eye was planted into the side view of the face. The top half of the body, the shoulders and chest, are best seen from the front, for then we see how the arms are hinged to the body. But arms and feet in movement are much more clearly seen sideways. That is the reason why Egyptians in these pictures look so strangely flat and contorted. (...) It must not be supposed that Egyptian artists thought that human beings looked like that. They merely followed a rule which allowed them to include everything in the human form that they considered important (SA, p.  61).
The Egyptian style, he continues, 
comprised a set of very strict laws which every artist had to learn from his earliest youth. Seated statues had to have their hands on their knees; men had to be painted with darker skin than women (…). But once he had mastered all these rules he had finished his apprenticeship. No one wanted anything different, no one asked him to be 'original'. On the contrary, he was probably considered the best artist who could make his statues most like the admired monuments of the past. So it happened that in the course of three thousand years or more Egyptian art changed very little. Everything that was considered good and beautiful in the times of the pyramids was held to be just as excellent a thousand years later. True, new fashions appeared, and new subjects were demanded of the artists, but their mode of representing man and nature remained essentially the same (SA, pp. 65-67).
This Egyptian style differs profoundly from other styles.  It clearly differs from so-called modern art, for example, but also from Greek art.  Of the Greek city-states, we know Athens was the most important, and this was true for the history of art, as well. It was in Athens, above all, writes Gombrich, at the beginning the 6th century, that “the greatest and most astonishing revolution in the whole history of art bore fruit”. The Greek sculptors “started where the Egyptians and Assyrians had left off”. However, soon thereafter, it was no longer a matter of “learning a ready-made formula for representing the human body. Every Greek sculptor wanted to know how he was to represent a particular body. The Egyptians had based their art on knowledge. The Greeks began to use their eyes” (SA, pp. 77-78).
Painters followed the same path, according to Greek writers, but none of the Greek paintings survived. Gombrich points out, however, that one can observe the decorative paintings on ceramic vases to get an idea about the development of Greek painting. On the first vases, painted in the 6th century, he writes, 
we still see traces of the Egyptian methods (…). Both figures are still shown strictly in profile. Their eyes still look as seen from in front. But their bodies are no longer drawn in the Egyptian fashion, nor are their arms and hands set out so clearly and so rigidly. The painter had obviously tried to imagine what it would really look like if two people were facing each other in that way (SA, pp. 78-81).
Figure 3 shows such a scene and illustrates how the artist is no longer afraid of showing only a part of a person´s hand, leaving the rest of it hidden behind the shoulder. He did not feel compelled to depict everything that composed the scene.  Once this old rule had been broken, and once the artist let himself be guided by his own eyes, says Gombrich, 
a veritable landslide started. Painters made the greatest discovery of all, the discovery of foreshortening. It was a tremendous moment in the history of art when, perhaps a little before 500 B.C., artists dared for the first time in all history to paint a foot as seen from in front. In all the thousands of Egyptian and Assyrian works which have come down to us, nothing of that kind had ever happened (SA, p. 81).
This can be observed in Figure 4, where the toes of one foot are depicted as a row of circles (and the shield is shown only partially, from the side).  Gombrich says that this simple detail “really meant that the old art was dead and buried. It meant that the artist no longer aimed at including everything in the picture in its most clearly visible form, but took account of the angle  from which he saw an object” (SA, pp. 84-87).
Another revolution in the same direction as the Greek revolution occurred in the 14th century beginning with the Italian Giotto who painted, among other things, the famous frescos of the Basilica of St. Francis of Assisi and the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua. As Gombrich comments, primitive Christian art before Giotto more or less reverted to certain patterns of Egyptian art.  He compared a miniature from the 13th century (Figure 5) with one of Giotto´s frescos in Padua (Figure 6) with a similar theme.
  The subject is the mourning over the dead body of Christ, with the Virgin embracing her son for the last time. In the miniature the artist was not interested in representing the scene as it might have happened. He varied the size of the figures so as to fit them well into the page, and if we try to imagine the space between the figures in the foreground and St. John in the background – with Christ and the Virgin in between – we realize how everything is squeezed together, and how little the artist cared about space  (SA, p. 202).
Gombrich points out that “Giotto's method is completely different”.  Influenced by Byzantine art (which had preserved most of the innovations of the Greek painters), and the Gothic art of northern Europe, Giotto took up realism again, and in his paintings, as Gombrich says, “We seem to witness the real event as if it were enacted on a stage” (Cf. SA, p. 202). 
This perspective culminated in the Renaissance in the 16th century when it was said, in Italy, that art had achieved perfection, as manifested in Michelangelo´s Pietà (Figure 7). Men like Michelangelo, Rafael, and Leonardo, writes Gombrich,
had actually done everything that former generations had tried to do. No problem of draughtsmanship seemed too difficult for them, no subject matter too complicated. They had shown how to combine beauty and harmony with correctness, and had even surpassed – so it was said – the most renowned statues of Greek and Roman antiquity (SA, p. 361).
But would it make sense to ask if Michelangelo was better than a 12th century Christian painter, or whether the Greeks were better painters than the Egyptians?  Or, to use the example of two great Spanish painters, is it meaningful to inquire if Picasso (the cubist Picasso) was better than Velázquez?
Velázquez painted, for example, an old water-seller in the streets of Seville (Figure 8).  As Gombrich describes,
The old man with his worn and wrinkled face and his ragged cloak, the big earthenware flask with its rounded shape, the surface of the glazed jug and the play of light on the transparent glass, all this is painted so convincingly that we feel we could touch the objects  (SA, p. 406).
The same is true of each of the paintings in Velázquez´s spectacular collection from Prado, such as Pablillos de Valladolid, which you may recall; and especially of the most famous of them, Las Meninas (Figure 9), in which Velázquez, as Gombrich says, “has arrested a real moment of time long before the invention of camera” (SA, p. 408).
And Picasso, the cubist Picasso?  Could anyone claim that he intended to capture, as with a camera, a real moment in time?  According to Gombrich, the reasoning underlying the cubist program could have been the following:
We have long given up claiming that we represent things as they appear to our eyes. That was a will-o'-the-wisp which it is useless to pursue. We do not want to fix on the canvas the imaginary impression of a fleeting moment. Let us follow Cezanne's example, and build up the picture of our motifs as solidly and enduringly as we can. Why not be consistent and accept the fact that our real aim is rather to construct something than to copy something? If we think of an object, let us say a violin, it does not appear before the eyes of our mind as we would see it with our bodily eyes. We can, and in fact do, think of its various aspects at the same time. Some of them stand out so clearly that we feel that we can touch and handle them; others are somehow blurred. And yet this strange medley of images represents more of the "real" violin than any single snapshot or meticulous painting could ever contain (SA, p. 574).
This idea is illustrated by Gombrich through a still-life that Picasso called Violin and Grapes (Figure 10). Gombrich writes:
In some respects it represents a return to what we have called the Egyptian principles, in which an object was drawn from the angle from which its characteristic form came out most clearly (...). The scroll and one peg are seen from the side as we imagine them when we think of a violin. The sound-holes, on the other hand, are seen as from in front—they would not be visible from the side. (…) The bow and the strings float somewhere in space; the strings even occur twice (…) (SA, p. 574).
According to him, “critics considered it an insult to their intelligence to be expected to believe that a violin ‘looks like that’” (SA, p. 575).  However, Picasso had no intention of insulting anyone, and even less of imitating a photograph of a violin in his painting.  He had other intentions, which, as we saw, were well justified and interesting.
Thus, in art, it does not make sense to compare two painters with such different styles as Velázquez and the cubist Picasso, or to inquire who is the better artist.  Each has a different proposal, just as the Egyptian and the Greek artist, and the Renaissance and the primitive Christian painter.  There is no single criterion, no common denominator, by which to judge the quality of one in relation to the other.  
 The case of science would be entirely different.  Why?  Contrary to art, science would not be divided by styles; it would not have these ruptures in its development that mark the different artistic modalities.  Compared to art, it is as if science had throughout its history a single objective: the totally explicit objective of discovering the truth, or knowing and explaining the world.  
Continuing the comparison with the art of painting, it is as if science had always had a single style throughout the centuries of its history.  And perhaps it is worth saying that it was more similar to the proposal of the style of the Greeks, of Michelangelo, Leonardo, and Velázquez. This is because, on the contrary, or at least more directly than the Egyptians (the primitive Christians and the cubists), it could be said that, in their case, there was a model of nature that they sought to represent in their paintings.  This model provided a criterion for evaluating the quality of the painting – of truth and falsehood, one could almost say, as in science, speaking more specifically of faithfulness or lack of faithfulness to the original model. 
Gombrich, referring to sculpture, commented on the development of the Greek style.  A sculptor, he said,
discovered how to chisel the trunk, another found out that a statue may look much more alive if the feet are not placed too firmly on the ground. Yet another would discover that he could make a face come alive by simply bending the mouth upwards so that it appeared to smile (SA, p. 78).
Each innovation, Gombrich explained, “was eagerly taken up by others who added their own discoveries”. This accumulation of discoveries that one observes within Greek style (and which reappears in the Renaissance) is what is traditionally attributed to science as a whole, regardless of historical period, as a general characteristic or defining aspect.  
As the science historian George Sarton wrote: "Indeed the scientific activity is the only one which is obviously and undoubtedly cumulative and progressive" (Sarton 1937, p. 10). The philosopher of science Karl Popper said the same thing:
...as a matter of historical fact, the history of science is by and large a history of progress. (Science seems to be the only field  of human endeavour  of which this can be said.) (Popper 1996, p.12).
In summary, we can say that art can present cumulative progress within a given style, as we just saw in the case of Greek art, which makes it possible to say, as was said in the Renaissance period, that Michelangelo had surpassed the most celebrated sculptors of Greek and Roman antiquity.  But only in science could it be said that progress occurs throughout its entire trajectory. Art would present localized progress with each artist being compared to others of the same style (albeit in distinct time periods).  However, science was portrayed as being characterized by a single line of development, by continual progress, with no ruptures, and would therefore be understood, in a strict sense, to be a progressive activity. 


3. Kuhn, the history and the philosophy of science
So how did Thomas Kuhn intend to change this traditional image of science by comparing it to art?  Kuhn was a physicist.  When he came in contact with the history of science, his intellectual trajectory took an unexpected turn.  He became an historian and wrote some important works in the history of science, such as The Copernican Revolution (1957), before then becoming a philosopher of science.  
Kuhn´s philosophy of science grew out of a feeling that something in our understanding of science was not quite right. Casually involved in a confrontation between the traditional image of science and the image revealed by the history of science, Kuhn was surprised by the profound differences between the two.  What were his expectations, and in what way did he feel there was a mismatch?
An episode described by Kuhn in the autobiographical preface to The Essential Tension, among other places, provides a clue.  In search of the origins of mechanics in the 17th century, Kuhn referred back to the physics of Aristotle, guided by the following question: “How much about mechanics was known within the Aristotelian tradition, and how much was left for seventeenth-century scientists to discover?” (Kuhn 1977, p. xi).  Familiar with the physics of Newton, his question was framed in Newtonian terms, and it was in these terms that he expected a response.  And the response that he got was that Aristotelians know very little about mechanics, that most of the things they affirmed about it were wrong, and that Galileo and his contemporaries had been obligated to reject all of it and start the study of mechanics over, from the beginning.  This would not have deserved much attention, according to Kuhn, if it were not for the intriguing fact that the wise old Aristotle, so astute and original on other subjects, revealed himself to be quite obtuse and even absurd with respect to mechanics.  
	His perplexity was finally overcome when Kuhn discovered that there was an alternative way of reading the Aristotelian texts he was face with.  According to Kuhn, the historian of science, when investigating the rise of a scientific theory, rarely can it be viewed as filling, with empirical laws, a gap in knowledge left by preceding theories.  Aristotelian physics, Kuhn points out, englobed the world completely, like Newtonian physics.  He writes:
A central tenet of Aristotle's physics was, for example, the impossibility of a void. Suppose that a modem physicist had told him that an arbitrarily close approximation to a void could now be produced in the laboratory. Probably Aristotle would have responded that a container emptied of air and other gases was not in his sense a void. That response would suggest that the impossibility of a void was not, in his physics, a merely empirical matter. Suppose now instead that Aristotle had conceded the physicist's point and announced that a void could, after all, exist in nature. Then he would have required a whole new physics, for his concept of the finite cosmos, of place within it, and of natural motion stand or fall together with his concept of the void. In that sense, too, the law-like statement "there are no voids in nature" did not function within Aristotelian physics quite as a law. It could not, that is, be eliminated and replaced by an improved version, leaving the rest of the structure standing (Kuhn 1977, p. 20).
With this new reading, Kuhn, as he himself said, did not become an Aristotelian, but rather learned, to some degree, to think as an Aristotelian (Kuhn 1977, pp xi-xii).  With this, in addition to recomposing for himself Aristotle's reputation, Kuhn is faced with a new relationship between scientific theories of a perhaps more complex nature than that which was the object of consideration of philosophers of science who had come before him, such as the logical positivists and Popper. It is an inter-theoretical relation that suggests that the passage from one theory to another may be much more problematic than previously imagined, much more radical and revolutionary.  What could this new relation be?
Perhaps this new relation between scientific theories was precisely like the relation between artistic styles.  One that suggests that a comparison between two scientific theories may be more problematic than previously imagined, and thus the choice between two scientific theories could also be more complicated – as complicated as choosing between two artistic styles, or judging who is the better painter, Velázquez or Picasso (cubist).  How can this situation be explained?  Could Aristotle´s case be an isolated example in the history of science?  Could it be a typical case?  And what could the consequences be for understanding science and for explaining scientific progress, in particular?  Questions like this form the basis for Kuhn´s philosophy of science.
The solution he found in the reading of Aristotle was a personal experience of something that, as he himself recognizes, “most historians learn by example in the course of professional training” (Kuhn 1977, p. xiii). What Kuhn wants to say is that historians in general, including historians of art, are prepared to deal with a situation in which there are ruptures like these in their object of study, as in the case of different schools of philosophy and different styles of art.  However, historians of science are (or were) unprepared. The reason for this is precisely the supposed difference between science and the other disciplines.  Rather than having points of rupture like those of art styles, science is expected show so-called linear progress, as if from the beginning of the development of science, all scientists contributed directly to the same basket of scientific knowledge.  And Kuhn asserted that the Aristotle episode, like many others in science, appears to vehemently deny this.
What was needed, primarily, to adequately understand the nature of science was a new history of science as a discipline – a new history of science prepared, like history of art, to perceive some changes as radical changes (like changes in style).  Happily, noted Kuhn, although a minority, there were already historians practicing this new history of science.  These new historians of science, among whom Kuhn recognizes the Russian Alexandre Koyré, “rather than seeking the permanent contributions of an older science to our present vantage”  as practitioners of traditional history mistakenly do  “attempt to display the historical integrity of that science in its own time” (Kuhn 1970, p. 3). Thus the objective of Kuhn´s project is to create “a sketch of the quite different concept of science that can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself”, or delineate a new image of science by making some of the implications of this new history of science explicit (Kuhn 1970, pp. 1 and 3).  
The solution defended by Kuhn appeals to a new way of looking at the situation in which choices between theories occur in science. As we saw, the history of science, according to Kuhn, has not supported the type of relation between scientific theories imagined by preceding philosophers, but rather points to a more complex situation in which rival theories can differ more radically than tradition would have us believe.  In these more radical cases, scientists are faced with a choice in which what is really at play are alternative ways of conceiving of an object and of doing science, as though they were different styles, and which Kuhn refers to, as most of you know, as paradigms.
According to the traditional point of view, the ideal scientist always acts rationally.  This means that, when choosing between two scientific theories, he/she will choose the best one, thus guaranteeing scientific progress. There is, of course, an underlying notion of competition among theories according to which it is always possible, in principle, to determine unequivocally which theory is better.  
Kuhn questions this traditional notion of inter-theoretical competition.  For him, the relation between competing theories – those that are separated by a scientific revolution – goes beyond the traditional notion of competition, and the situation of choice that the scientist truly faces is in fact quite different, as in the case involving the physics of Aristotle and the mechanics of Galileo and Newton, which have distinct premises. Kuhn writes: 
Consider first my remarks on proof. The point I have been trying to make is a simple one, long familiar in philosophy of science. Debates over theory-choice cannot be cast in a form that fully resembles logical or mathematical proof. In the latter, premises and rules of inference are stipulated from the start. If there is disagreement about conclusions, the parties to the ensuing debate can retrace their steps one by one, checking each against prior stipulation. At the end of that process one or the other must concede that he has made a mistake, violated a previously accepted rule. After that concession he has no recourse, and his opponent’s proof is then compelling. Only if the two discover instead that they differ about the meaning or application of stipulated rules, that their prior agreement provides no sufficient basis for proof, does the debate continue in the form it inevitably takes during scientific revolutions. That debate is about premises, and its recourse is to persuasion as a prelude to the possibility of proof (Kuhn 1970, p. 199. See also pp. 94 and 152 and Kuhn 2000, p. 163).
We can observe, preliminarily, that two theories may have a weakly competitive relation.  Kuhn reminds us that the most recent theory could, for example, present a higher level, such that it englobes its predecessor as a special case. According to Kuhn, the theory of conservation of energy has a similar link with dynamics, chemistry, electricity, optics, and thermal theory (Cf. Kuhn 1970, p. 95). But if, given this, we are perhaps able to continue speaking in terms of competing theories, we are no longer authorized to think of the passage from one theory to another in terms of a revolution.  Only a semantic distortion would make it be possible to speak more adequately of a revolution than of a broadening, extension, or reform.  
According to Kuhn, revolutions in science are episodes when theories (paradigms) are substituted.  He enumerates cases of this type throughout the history of science.  For example, he considers revolutionary those episodes that culminate with the adhesion of the scientific community to theories such as:  Copernican astronomy, Galileo´s dynamics, Newtonian mechanics, Lavoisier´s chemistry, Einstein´s relativity, Maxwell´s thermodynamics, Dalton´s atomic theory, Bohr´s theory of the hydrogen spectrum, Ohm´s law... Revolutions, according to Kuhn, usually originate from crises that have upset the research guided by a scientific theory, and they represent the most radical response to such crises.  More than substitution in itself, revolution results from a fundamental characteristic of the relation between scientific theories.  It is this relation that he seeks to explain using another famous concept:  the concept of incommensurability. What is a relation of incommensurability?
As you may have guessed, it is a relation similar to the relation between different styles in art.  As we saw at the beginning, Michelangelo´s contemporaries during the Renaissance believed he was a better sculptor than the Greeks.  This was possible because the works of Michelangelo and the Greeks could be considered manifestations of the same style.   After all, the so-called Renaissance was a Renaissance precisely of Greek and Roman art.  However, as we also saw, it would not make sense to compare Greek art to Egyptian art, or Velázquez to the cubist Picasso, and judge who the better painter is.  Kuhn would say that, in the latter case, the relations between styles are incommensurable, i.e. cannot be compared in the same way that works of art within the same style can be compared.
But there are, of course, also differences between art and science.​[4]​ The most important of these creates a serious problem for Kuhn.  Contrary to science, art does not necessarily have a theoretical or cognitive content. Science always has a cognitive pretension and its theories can be true or false.  Paintings, sculptures, and even poems are not, in principle, true or false. As Rudolf Carnap observed, a poet "does not assert that the verses of another are wrong or erroneous; he usually contents himself with calling them bad” (Carnap 1935, pp. 30-31).
So wouldn't the approximation between science and art lead one to think that the choice between two scientific theories could be – like, supposedly, the choice between two styles in art – a mere question of taste?  And if taste is something that is not debatable, where does the proverbial critical sense in science fit in?  In other words, how could science continue to be an essentially rational activity if placed in the “bad company” of art, an activity considered essentially non-rational? And if one cannot speak of progress in the passage from one artistic style to another, how can one speak of progress in science?

4. Final considerations
These are fundamental questions that Kuhn will seek to answer in his famous book. I consider this lecture to be, above all, an introduction to this book​[5]​, and now is the very moment to invite you all to read The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. I believe that, if you keep in mind the parallel between science and art, it will provide you with an interesting and useful perspective for understanding it better.​[6]​  
In conclusion, within the art-science parallelism, it could also be said that Kuhn´s philosophy of science is more 'visual', more descriptive, more like Greek art, in its proposal to construct empirical data about science as it was and is effectively being practiced by scientists.  And this appears to be an obvious procedure; but it is contrary to the contemporary positivist tradition, with its logical nature that could be likened more to Egyptian art, which is more 'conceptual' or normative, with its construction based on previous concepts about rationality and progress and about what science should be.
Regardless, Kuhn´s philosophy of science is not to be confused with an inductive theory, merely and immaculately descriptive.  Perhaps the same comment made by Gombrich about Greek art applies to it:
What makes it unique is precisely the directed efforts, the continued and systematic modifications of the schemata of conceptual art, till making was replaced by the matching of reality through the new skill of mimesis. We mistake the character of this skill if we speak of the imitation of nature. Nature cannot be imitated or "transcribed" without first being taken apart and put together again. This is not the work of observation alone but rather of ceaseless experimentation. For here, too, the term "observation" has tended to mislead rather than enlighten (Gombrich 2000, pp. 141-142).
But this is another story. . . I apologize if you found this journey through the history of science and the history of art to illustrate the “structure” of a philosophical revolution tiresome (Cf. Kuhn 1970, pp. 77-78). And I also ask you to forgive the terrible service of the “guide speaking Spanish throughout the trip”, as the travel agencies say.  Thank you very much. 
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Figure 1. Amenophis IV (Akhenaten), c. 1360 BC. Limestone relief. 

































































































































































Figure 10. Pablo Picasso. Violin and grapes, 1912. Oil on canvas. Museum of Modern Art, New York (SA, p. 575).
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^1	  Lecture given at the University of Valladolid (Spain) in May, 2003. I essentially preserve the original text here with some indispensable notes and bibliographic references added.  The form of the lecture, appropriate for an introductory approach to the theme, was maintained for a practical reason – the difficulty of altering the tone of the entire text – and also for a more important theoretical reason:  in the manuscripts (draft versions) of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that are available in the Kuhn Archive at MIT (which I recently had access to), the relation between science and art is considered by Kuhn himself to be a fundamental aspect of his introduction to the book.  He considers the comparison of the history of science and the history of art to be the simplest way to initially establish the contrast between cumulative progress and scientific revolution, which he would later develop in the book.  See my paper "Thomas Kuhn, the Image of Science and the Image of Art" (Pinto de Oliveira, forthcoming).
^2	  Kuhn refers directly to Gombrich in The Essential Tension, leaving no room for speculation regarding which history of art he is referring to when he links it to the history of science and to the origin of Structure (Kuhn 1977, pp. 340-341). See another paper of mine on Kuhn and Gombrich: “Creativity, Continuity and Discontinuity in Science and Art” (Pinto de Oliveira 2011).
^3	  Henceforth referred to as SA. 
^4	  Kuhn makes an effort to affirm and point this out in The Essential Tension (Kuhn 1977, pp. 341-343 and 347). What is important for him, really, is not to deny differences, but rather to show that the differences are not where they are traditionally believed to be (as in the idea that, contrary to art, science presents strictly cumulative progress). See Kuhn 1977, pp. 349-350.
^5	  Actually, the text has the intention of serving as an introduction to Kuhn´s philosophy of science, and also as an introduction to Kuhn´s conception about the relations between the history of science and the history of art.  The somewhat ambiguous title reflects the double purpose.  
^6	  In the manuscripts (draft versions) of Structure, the relation between science and art is considered by Kuhn himself to be a fundamental aspect of the introduction to the book. See note 1 above.
